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1 Introduction
One of the principal concerns of any firm is to configure the supply of intermediate goods
essential to its production. Of late, with the liberalization of trade and the lowering of
barriers to entry, supply chain configurations have assumed global proportions. Indeed, in
several industries, it has become the trend for firms to cut across national boundaries and
outsource their supplies “offshore”, provided the economic lure is strong enough. Many
diverse factors influence firms’ decisions. First, of course, there is the immediate cost of
procuring the goods which—other things being equal—firms invariably seek to minimize.
Then there is the question of risk: a firm may be unwilling to commit itself to a single party
and instead spread its orders among others, even if they happen to be costlier, in order
to ensure a steady flow of inputs. Sometimes a firm may tie up with a broad spectrum of
suppliers so as to increase its access to the latest technological innovation, which could be
forthcoming from any one of them. There can arise situations when a firm is impelled to select
suppliers that will be strategic allies in its endeavor to penetrate newly emerging markets.
For the analysis of these and other factors, and how they impinge on firms’ decisions, see, e.g.,
Jarillo (1993), Spiegel (1993), Vidal and Goetschalkx (1997), Domberger (1998), Aggarwal
(2003), Shy and Stenbacka (2003) and Chen et al. (2004).
One intriguing possibility that has been alluded to, but not much explored, is that strate-
gic incentives may arise in an oligopoly which outweigh other considerations and play the
pivotal role in firms’ selection of suppliers. Instances of this are presented by Jarillo and
Domberger, of which we recount only two.
The first case comes from Germany. AEG1 used to be a traditional supplier to both
BMW2 and Mercedes Benz. At some point, with a view to vertical integration, Mercedes
Benz acquired AEG. This caused BMW to look for a different supplier, despite the inevitable
extra costs of the switch (see p. 67, Jarillo, 1993).
The second case involves General Electric (GE) in the United States. In the early 1980’s,
GE investigated the possibility of outsourcing its lower brand microwave ovens from outside,
since these had become too costly to manufacture at its factory in Maryland. Discussions
were first held with, and even trial orders given to, Matsushita which happened to be a major
rival of GE and also the world leader for this product in terms of both volume and technology.
But ultimately GE turned to Samsung, then a small company with little experience in
microwaves. The strategy entailed additional costs, such as sending American engineers to
Korea, but it worked well for GE (see, pp. 84-86, Jarillo, 1993; and also Case Study 6.2, p.
108, Domberger, 1998).
Such case studies clearly point to the need for a game-theoretic analysis. In this paper
we bring to light a scenario in which the outsourcing patterns emerge out of the strategic
competition between firms. We find that it is typically not the case that a firm will outsource
supplies to its rivals. There are two distinct reasons for this. The first is based on increasing
returns to scale: if a firm places a sizeable order with its rival, it significantly lowers the
rival’s costs on account of the increasing returns, and this stands to its detriment in the
ensuing competition on the final product. Thus the firm is led to outsource to others who
may be costlier but, being out of the final product market, do not pose the threat of future
1Allgemeine Deutsche Electricita¨tsgesellschaft
2Bayerische Motoren Werke (or, Bavarian Motor Works)
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competition. The second reason is more subtle and persists even in the case of constant
returns to scale (i.e., linear costs)—indeed, it comes to the fore in this case. It is the main
focus of this paper.
To be precise, suppose there are firms N competing in the market for a final product α.
Intermediate goods η are critical inputs in the production of α, but only some of the firms
I ⊂ N have the competence to manufacture η at reasonable cost. The other firms J ≡ N\I
must obtain η from elsewhere. One possibility is to outsource η to their rivals in I. But there
is also a fringe of firms O on the “outside” which can manufacture η. What distinguishes
O from I is that no firm in O can enter the market for the final product α. (This could
be because it lacks the technology to convert η to α, or else faces high set-up costs—and,
possibly, other barriers to entry—in the market α.3) To keep matters simple, we consider a
purely linear model, i.e., in which the costs of production for both η and α are linear; as is
the market demand for α.
Our main result is that, in this scenario, strategic considerations can come into play that
will cause the firms in J to outsource η (outside) to O rather than (inside) to I, even if the
costs of manufacturing η are higher in O than in I, so long as they are not much higher.
The intuition goes roughly as follows and is best seen when I and J consist of single firms
and the outside fringe O is a competitive sector whose members simply quote their cost as
the price at which they will provide the intermediate good. (Thus O has no strategic role
here. However, we show that our results remain intact when O is taken to be strategic,
indeed a monopolist,4 though at the cost of a more complicated analysis.) Suppose (i) I and
J are Cournot duopolists which compete in the market for the final product α; (ii) I and O
can produce the intermediate good η, but J cannot; and (iii) O cannot enter the market for
α. Thus J must decide how to allocate its order of η between I and O, and then how much of
it to use in the production of α, freely disposing of the unused portion of η. We show that the
optimal course of action for J is to outsource exclusively to either I or O, never to both, and
to use the entire input to produce α. (Thus, in equilibrium, free disposal will not be availed
of even though it is permitted.) Now if J outsources to I, then I immediately knows the
amount outsourced. This has the effect of establishing J as leader in the Stackelberg game
that ensues in the market for α, in which I is forced to become the follower. In contrast, if
J outsources to O then—thanks to the sanctity of the secrecy clause—I will only know that
J has struck a deal with O but not the quantity that J has outsourced. Thus I and J will
remain Cournot duopolists in the ensuing game on market α.
If costs for manufacturing η do not vary too much between I and O, then I will earn less
as a Stackelberg follower than as a Cournot duopolist. This will tempt I to push J towards
O by quoting so high a price for the intermediate good η that, in spite of the premium that
3In particular, think of the following set-up. The market for α is concentrated in the “developed world”.
The firms in O, on the other hand, are located offshore in the “developing world” and can manufacture η but
lack the (advanced) technology for converting η to α. Even if some of them were to make the technological
breakthrough, they would face not just the standard set-up costs for penetrating the market α, but further
barriers to entry that pertain to foreign firms. This international setting perhaps makes our hypothesis of
an outside fringe O more viable. But we do not need it, and all we formally postulate is the existence of this
fringe.
4The moment O has two or more (identical) firms, Bertrand competition will bring the price they quote
down to the level of their cost and O will in effect be a competitive sector. (Note that we postulate linear
costs and unbounded capacity). Thus, within the parameters of our model, O can be strategic only if it is a
monopolist.
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J is willing to pay for the privilege of being the leader, J prefers to go to O. The temptation
can only be resisted if it is feasible for I to provide η at such an exorbitant price that it can
recoup as provider what it loses as follower. But such an exorbitant price is undercut by the
competitive price prevailing at O, as long as O’s costs are not too much higher than I’s. The
upshot is that in any subgame-perfect pure strategy Nash equilibrium (SPNE) of the game,
J will outsource to O. Throughout our analysis, we confine ourselves to pure strategies.
Which subgame gets played between I and J on market α—Cournot or Stackelberg—is
thus not apriori fixed, but endogenous to equilibrium. This is all the more striking since, in
our overall game, the option is open for firm J to outsource to both I and O and to thus bring
any “mixture” of the Stackelberg and Cournot games into play. The logic of the SPNE rules
out mixing and shows that only one of the two pure games will occur along the equilibrium
play.
Worthy of note is the fact that it is not J who has the “primary” strategic incentive to
outsource to O. This incentive resides with I who is anxious to ward off J and force J to
turn to O. The anxiety gets played out when O does not have a severe cost disadvantage
compared to J. Otherwise, I is happy to strike a deal with J since it can get high provider
prices that compensate it for becoming a follower. That inside firms would want to provide
inputs to their competitors at high prices is quite common and has been commented on (e.g.,
Hart and Tirole, 1990; Ordover et al., 1990; Rey and Tirole, 2006). What is surprising in our
scenario is that high prices are quoted not to earn revenue at the expense of the competitor
but instead to ward it off and compel it to seek its supply elsewhere.
The actual argument is more intricate and the exact result is presented in Section 4. As
was said, there are no economies of scale or cost advantages for the outside firm O. In fact,
we suppose that O has a higher cost than I for manufacturing η. Our main result states that,
if O’s cost does not exceed a well-defined threshold, J will outsource to O in any SPNE.
Our formal model is as follows. The market for the intermediate good η meets first,
followed by duopolistic competition between I and J on the final good α. Since the outside
competitive fringe O stands ready to supply η at its cost price, firm I must counter this
with a price quote of its own for η. Then both firms I and J, seeing these prices, decide
how much of η to outsource to I and to O. The outsourcing orders are subject to a secrecy
clause, which is tantamount to I and J placing their orders simultaneously. The only act
that could destroy the simultaneity is a preliminary announcement by I of the quantity of η
it intends to produce (outsource to itself). But, in the absence of an external enforcement
agency, such an announcement would not constitute a credible commitment and would be
like “cheap talk” which can be ignored. We discuss this issue in more detail in Section 6.1.
The secrecy clause is crucial for our analysis. It can be upheld on the simple ground
that it is routinely seen in practice (see, e.g., Temponi and Lambert, 2001; Ravenhill, 2003;
Hoecht and Trott, 2006) and it is often a legally binding provision (see, e.g., Khalfan, 2004;
Vagadia, 2007). The evidence supporting the secrecy clause is discussed in Section 6.2.
Moreover we give a plausibility argument that, in certain scenarios, it holds endogenously in
equilibrium.
It must also be pointed out that our model is one-shot (corresponding to discounting
the future very heavily if one were to think of a multi-period setting) and in effect all
goods are perishable. With a long time horizon, durable goods and players who are patient,
other kinds of SPNE would surely emerge. All these considerations—possibility of credible
commitments, breakdown of the secrecy clause, long time horizon—are clearly important
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issues but lie beyond the scope of this paper.
Our analysis indicates that firms which position themselves on the “outside”, by not
entering the market for the final product, are more likely to attract orders for intermediate
goods. There is some evidence that this can happen in practice. By the mid-1980’s (see
Ravenhill, 2003), US companies in the electronics industry were looking “to diversify their
sources of supply” in order to fare better against their Japanese competitors. Malaysia and
Singapore made a strong bid to get the US business. A key feature of the government policies
of both nations was that “they were not attempting to promote national champions in the
electronic industry”, but the objective was rather “to build a complementary supply base,
not to create local rivals that might displace foreign producers”. Their success in becoming
major supply hubs for electronic components is well documented. Of course it is true that
they had the advantage of low-cost skilled labor. But what we wish to underscore is their
deliberate and well-publicized abstention from markets for the final products, which by itself
gave them a competitive edge. To reiterate this implication of our analysis in more ambitious
terms: the current widespread trend of outsourcing to offshore locations may well persist for
strategic reasons, even if offshore costs were to rise, so long as the offshore companies abstain
from the final product markets of their clients.
The paper is organized as follows. We discuss the related literature in Section 2. The
model is presented in Section 3, and the main result is described in Section 4. It holds for
both scenarios, the one where the outside firm is strategic and the other where it is part of a
competitive fringe. An outline of its proof, followed by the formal proof itself (modulo some
technical lemmas) are in Section 5. In Section 6 we discuss several extensions and variations
of the model. Proofs of the technical lemmas are relegated to an Appendix.
2 Related Literature
Outsourcing of inputs is such an important and widespread phenomenon that it has been
studied from various points of view. First, it can be driven by cost considerations or by
differences in productivity across firms (see, e.g., Grossman and Helpman, 2002; Antra`s and
Helpman, 2004; and the references therein). A second argument is based on niche markets.
A firm may be attracted to an exclusive outsourcing contract with a supplier who can provide
highly specialized inputs, in order to market a differentiated final product that limits the
intensity of price competition (Shaked and Sutton, 1982). There are explanations based on
economies of scale. It is cost-effective to outsource inputs instead of undertaking redundant
investment of one’s own, all the more so if one’s rivals have already gone to an outsider and
created the scale there (Shy and Stenbacka, 2003). Even when the rival is doing in-house
production, there is pressure to outsource because placing orders with the rival will only
enhance its economies of scale and lower its costs, making it a more formidable competitor
in the final goods market (Chen and Dubey, 2009). Another rationale for outsourcing is based
on imperfect competition in the input markets. By outsourcing orders with a supplier to
which its rival has already gone, a firm accomplishes two things: first, it raises the input price,
which softens the competition in the final goods market and can generate a net gain (Buehler
and Haucap, 2006); second, it prevents the rival from extracting monopolistic benefits from
the supplier (Arya et al., 2008a). Another line of argument in favor of outsourcing runs as
follows. A vertically integrated provider, which competes in the final product market, will
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have incentive to “hold up” its supply once investments have been sunk in the procurement
process (Heavner, 2004). Furthermore there is the considerable risk that the business plans
of the input-seeking firm will get revealed to its rival via the orders placed. On both counts,
it is safer for the firm to outsource inputs to an outsider.
Of course, the other side of the story has also been discussed. If a negotiated agreement
can be reached to share the gains, it could become optimal to order inputs from a rival
(Spiegel, 1993). Indeed trade of intermediate goods may enable rivals to collude, via con-
tractual agreements based on that trade, and thereby sustain a high price in the downstream
market for the final product (Chen 2001; Chen et al., 2004; Arya et al., 2008b).
Each of these explanations clearly has its own merit, but our purpose here is to bring a
new strategic consideration to the fore which can sometimes be critical to firms’ behavior. To
this end, we present a stripped-down model in which none of the factors above are present.
There are no cost benefits, comparative advantage, niche markets, economies of scale or
possibility of collusion; nor is there reluctance in the firm to reveal its business plans to the
provider. On the contrary, the strategic competition in our model creates incentive for the
input-seeking firm to fully reveal its plans to the vertically integrated rival, with the intent of
becoming Stackelberg leader in the final product market. It is the rival who, seeing through
this ploy, refuses to play the role of the input provider and drives the firm to outsource
elsewhere.
There is also considerable literature on endogenous Stackelberg leadership.5 The paper
most closely related to ours, and inviting immediate comparison, is Baake et al (1999). They
consider a duopoly model to examine what they call “cross-supplies” within an industry—in
our parlance, this is the phenomenon that a firm outsources to its rival. The “endogenous
Stackelberg effect” is indeed pointed out by them: firm A, upon accepting the order out-
sourced by its rival B, automatically becomes a Stackelberg follower in the ensuing game
on the final markets. But there are set-up costs of production in their model, and provided
these costs are high enough, A can charge B a sufficiently high price so as to be compensated
for being a follower. The upshot is that cross-supplies can be sustained in SPNE.
There are several points of difference between their model and ours. First, their argument
relies crucially on the presence of sufficiently strong economies of scale (set-up costs). If these
are absent or weak, there is no outsourcing in SPNE in their model. In contrast, in our model,
outsourcing occurs purely on account of the endogenous Stackelberg effect (recall that we
have constant returns to scale6). Second, outsourcing occurs only in some of their SPNE:
there always coexist other SPNE where it does not occur. In our model, the outsourcing is
invariant across all SPNE. In short, they show that outsourcing can occur, while we show
that it must. Third, it is critical for their result that there be no outside suppliers.7 Such
suppliers would generate competition that would make it infeasible for A to charge a high
price to B, invalidating their result. In our model, the situation is different. We allow for
both kinds of suppliers: those that are inside as potential rivals and others that are outside.
It turns out that increasing the number of either type leaves our result intact (see Section
6.4). Finally—and this, to our mind, is the most salient difference—the economic phenomena
depicted in Baake et al. and here are different, indeed almost complementary. In Baake et
5E.g., Hamilton and Slutsky (1990), Robson (1990), Mailath (1993), Pal (1996), van Damme and Hurkens
(1999)—in all of which the timing of entry by firms is viewed as strategic.
6Though outsourcing is further boosted by economies of scale in our model. See Section 6.4.
7Recall that these are suppliers who are not present as rivals in the final product market.
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al., the issue is to figure out when a firm will outsource to its rival. Here we consider precisely
the opposite scenario and pinpoint conditions under which a firm will turn away from its
rival and outsource instead to an outsider, even if the outsider happens to have a costlier
technology. The fact that both models take cognizance of the endogenous Stackelberg effect
is a technical—albeit interesting—point. What is significant is that this effect is embedded
in disparate models and utilized to explain complementary economic phenomena.
3 The model
We shall first present Model 1 in which O is a strategic monopolist and then Model 2 where
O is a competitive sector. The reason for this order is mathematical brevity: Model 2 can
immediately be derived from Model 1 by the simple expedient of setting O’s provider price
equal to its cost.
Model 1: strategic outside firm
For ease of notation, we substitute 0, 1, 2 for O, I, J. As was said, firms 1 and 2 are duopolists
in the market for a final good α. An intermediate good η is required to produce α. Firm 1
can manufacture η, but 2 cannot. There is an “outside” firm 0 which can also manufacture
η. What distinguishes 0 from 1 is that 0 cannot enter the market for the final good α. Firm
0’s sole means of profit is the manufacture of good η for the “inside” firms 1 and 2.
Let x1 and x2 be the respective quantities of α produced by firms 1 and 2, and P (.) be
the price of α. The inverse market demand for good α is
P (x1 + x2) = [a− x1 − x2]+ where y+ ≡ max{y, 0} and a is a positive constant. (1)
The constant marginal cost of production of good η is c0 for 0 and c1 for 1. Furthermore
both 1 and 2 can convert one unit of good η into one unit of good α at the (for simplicity)
same constant marginal cost, which w.l.o.g we normalize to zero. We assume
0 < c1 < c0 < (a+ c1)/2. (2)
The condition c1 < c0 gives a cost disadvantage to the outside firm 0 and loads the dice
against good η being sourced to it. The inequality c0 < (a+ c1)/2 prevents 1 from automat-
ically becoming a monopolist in the market for good α.
The extensive form game between the three firms is completely specified by the parame-
ters c1, c0, a and so we shall denote it Γ(c0, c1, a). For i ∈ {0, 1} and j ∈ {1, 2}, let
qij ≡ quantity of good η outsourced by firm j to firm i and
xj ≡ quantity of good α supplied by firm j.
The game Γ(c0, c1, a) is played as follows.
Stage 1: Firms 0 and 1 simultaneously and publicly announce prices p0 and p1 at which
they are ready to provide good η.
Stage 2: Firm 2 chooses q12 (quantity of η to order from firm 1 at price p1).
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Stage 3: For every (p0, p1, q
1
2), 1 and 2 play the simultaneous-move game G(p0, p1, q
1
2) where
1. Firm 1 chooses q01 (quantity of η to order from firm 0 at price p0), q
1
1 (quantity of η to
produce by itself at cost c1) and x1 (quantity of α to put up in the final goods market)
subject to:
(i) q01 + q
1
1 ≥ q12 (the total amount of η is at least q12 so that it is able to honor its
commitment to supply q12 units of η to firm 2) and (ii) x1 ≤ q01 + q11 − q12 (quantity of α
must be producible from the amount of η left on hand after fulfilling the order of firm 2),
so that the strategy set of firm 1 in G(p0, p1, q
1
2) is
S1(q
1
2) = {(q01, q11, x1) ∈ R3+|q01 + q11 ≥ q12 and x1 ≤ q01 + q11 − q12}. (3)
Note that “≤” is tantamount to allowing free disposal of the intermediate good (input).8
2. Firm 2 chooses q02 (quantity of η to order from firm 0 at price p0) and x2 (quantity of α to
put up in the final goods market) subject to x2 ≤ q02+q12 (quantity of α must be producible
from the total η it has ordered). Therefore the strategy set of firm 2 in G(p0, p1, q
1
2) is
S2(q
1
2) = {(q02, x2) ∈ R2+|x2 ≤ q02 + q12}. (4)
It remains to describe the payoffs of the three firms at the terminal nodes of the game tree.
Any such node is specified by p ≡ (p0, p1), q ≡ {qij}i=0,1j=1,2 and x ≡ (x1, x2). For i = 0, 1, 2, the
payoff Πi(p, q) is given by
Π0(p, q) = p0(q
0
1 + q
0
2)︸ ︷︷ ︸
revenue from η
− c0(q01 + q02)︸ ︷︷ ︸
cost of η
, (5)
Π1(p, q, x) = P (x1 + x2)x1︸ ︷︷ ︸
revenue from α
+ p1q
1
2︸︷︷︸
revenue from η
− (p0q01 + c1q11)︸ ︷︷ ︸
cost of η
and (6)
Π2(p, q, x) = P (x1 + x2)x2︸ ︷︷ ︸
revenue from α
− (p0q02 + p1q12)︸ ︷︷ ︸
cost of η
. (7)
This completes the description of the game Γ(c0, c1, a).
Remark (On the Timing of Moves)We have supposed in our game that firm 2 chooses q12
in stage 2 after finding out p0, p1 announced in stage 1; and that subsequently it chooses q
0
2, x2
in stage 3 but without knowing anything further than p0, p1, q
1
2. This is entirely equivalent
to choosing q12, q
0
2, x2 simultaneously in stage 2 after finding out p0, p1.
But for firm 1, the timing we have described is important. Firm 1 chooses q01, q
1
1, x1 after
finding out the order q12 placed by firm 2. This timing is logically necessary. Were firm 1
to announce q01, q
1
1, x1 before knowing q
1
2, it could always renege on its announcement and
choose a new q˜01, q˜
1
1, x˜1 after knowing q
1
2. Due to the secrecy clause, firm 2 does not even
know if and when firm 1 has gone to 0, leave aside the quantity q01 it has ordered. As for q
1
1
and x1, these are known to firm 1 alone. Thus firm 1 has the full power to revise q
0
1, q
1
1, x1.
In the absence of binding contracts, which could be written before a third party such as a
courthouse empowered to enforce it, the prior announcement of q01, q
1
1, x1 by firm 1 does not
constitute a credible commitment and has no effect (see Section 6.1).
8We thank an anonymous referee for suggesting that we formally incorporate free disposal in our model.
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Model 2: competitive outside fringe
For contrast, and to gain better perspective, we shall consider a variant9 Model 2 in which
O is a competitive fringe of many outside firms. In this scenario we may take the choice
made by a representative firm 0 of O to be p0 ≡ c0 (so that Π0 ≡ 0). Thus firm 0 is in
effect a “strategic dummy” and we wind up with strategic competition only between firms
1 and 2. We denote this game Γ˜(c0, c1, a). The formal mathematical definition of Γ˜(c0, c1, a)
is exactly the same as that of Γ(c0, c1, a) except that we take p0 ≡ c0 to be an exogenously
fixed constant. We seek to find subgame-perfect pure strategy Nash equilibrium (SPNE) of
Γ(c0, c1, a) and Γ˜(c0, c1, a). Henceforth we shall often denote the games by simply Γ and Γ˜.
4 The main result
Our main result asserts that if the cost disadvantage of the outside firm 0 is not too significant
(i.e. c0 − c1 is not too large), then there is outsourcing to 0 in any SPNE of both Γ and Γ˜.
The Main Result (Strategic outside firm or competitive outside fringe) There is
a threshold θ̂(c1) ∈ (c1, (a + c1)/2) such that if c0 ∈ (c1, θ̂(c1)), then in any SPNE of either
Γ(c0, c1, a) or Γ˜(c0, c1, a), firm 2 orders η exclusively from the outside firm 0.
Observe that when c0 ∈ (c1, θ̂), firm 0 has a cost disadvantage compared to firm 1, yet 2
outsources η to 0 rather than to 1. Strategic considerations dominate firms’ behavior here.
To keep these strategic incentives in the foreground, we have assumed in the paper that
c0 > c1.
10 The main result is also summarized in Figure 1 below, in which c0 is varied on
the horizontal axis, holding a and c1 fixed.
Figure 1: The Main Result
This figure confirms our claim that outsourcing to offshore locations will persist for
strategic reasons, even if offshore costs rise moderately so long as the offshore companies
abstain from the final product markets of their clients.
4.1 SPNE of Γ and Γ˜: The detailed characterization
In this section we fully characterize SPNE of Γ (Theorem 1) and Γ˜ (Theorem 2). The proofs
are in Section 5. It will be useful to first state the following lemma.
Lemma 1 In any SPNE of Γ(c0, c1, a) or Γ˜(c0, c1, a), we must have (i) p0 ≥ c1 and (ii) q01 = 0
(firm 1 does not outsource to firm 0).
9We are grateful to an anonymous referee for suggesting this variant.
10Below this interval, when c0 ≤ c1, 0 has a cost advantage over 1 and so 2 even more readily outsourced
to 0; in fact, for small enough c0, both 1 and 2 outsource to 0.
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Proof See the Appendix.
By Lemma 1, in any SPNE play of Γ or Γ˜, firm 1’s constant marginal cost is c1. Fix the
inverse demand as in (1) and 1’s cost at c1. For constant marginal cost c2 ≥ 0 of firm 2, let
• C(c2) be the Cournot duopoly with firms 1 and 2, and
• S21(c2) be the Stackelberg duopoly with firm 2 as the leader and firm 1 as the follower.
Let (xC1 (c2), x
C
2 (c2)) be the quantities of firms 1 and 2 in the unique NE of C(c2) and
(xS1(c2), x
S
2(c2)) be the quantities in the unique SPNE of S21(p1). Also define
x˜S1(c2) := max{xS1(c2), xC1 (0)} and x˜S2(c2) := min{xS2(c2), xC2 (0)}. (8)
Let (p0, p1) be the pair of prices announced in Stage 1 in an SPNE of Γ (p0 ≡ c0 for Γ˜).
Denote by G(p0, p1) the game played between firms 1 and 2 following the announcement
(p0, p1). Let x ≡ (x1, x2) and q ≡ {qij}i=0,1j=1,2. By Lemma 1, q01 = 0 in any SPNE of G(p0, p1).
The following definitions will be useful.
(a) We say that the Cournot outcome is played in G(p0, p1) if (x1, x2) = (x
C
1 (p0), x
C
2 (p0)).
(b) We say that the Stackelberg outcome is played in G(p0, p1) if (x1, x2) = (x˜
S
1(p1), x˜
S
2(p1)).
(c) Firm 2’s order of η is called exclusive if q01q
1
2 = 0 (i.e., firm 2 does not order a positive
amount of η from both 0 and 1).
(d) For j = 1, 2, (xj, q
0
j , q
1
j ) is said to satisfy the no wastage property for firm j if every unit
of η ordered by j is completely utilized (either to supply α or to provide η to another
firm). As q01 = 0, this property holds for firm 1 if q
1
1 = q
1
2 + x1. It holds for firm 2 if
q01 + q
0
2 = x2.
For any interval [u, v] ⊆ [c1, (a+ c1)/2], define
(Graph τ)[u, v] ≡ {(p0, τ(p0))|p0 ∈ [u, v]} and abbreviate
Graph τ ≡ (Graph τ)[c1, (a+ c1)/2].
(Graph τ)[u, v] is portrayed in Figure 2.
Theorem 1 (Strategic outside firm) There is a threshold θ̂(c1) ∈ (c1, (a + c1)/2) such
that, in the game Γ(c0, c1, a) the following hold.
(I) In any SPNE, (a) firm 1 never outsources to firm 0 (q01 = 0), (b) firm 2’s order of η
is exclusive (q01q
0
2 = 0) and (c) the no wastage property holds for both firms 1 and 2.
(II) If c0 ∈ (c1, θ̂(c1)), there is a continuum of SPNE, indexed by supplier prices (p0, p1) ∈
(Graph τ)[c0, θ̂(c1)]. For any such (p0, p1), G(p0, p1) has a unique SPNE where firm 2
outsources η to the outside firm 0 and the Cournot outcome is played, i.e., q12 = 0,
q11 = x1 = x
C
1 (p0) and q
0
2 = x2 = x
C
2 (p0).
10
Figure 2: Graph τ [u, v]
(III) If c0 ∈ (θ̂(c1), (a + c1)/2), there is a continuum of SPNE, indexed by supplier prices
(p0, p1) ∈ (Graph τ)[c1, c0]. For any such (p0, p1), G(p0, p1) has a unique SPNE where
firm 2 outsources η to firm 1 and the Stackelberg outcome is played, i.e., q02 = 0,
q11 = q
1
2 + x1, q
1
2 = x2 = x
S
2(p1) and x1 = x
S
1(p1).
(IV) Finally, if c0 = θ̂(c1), there are two SPNE with the same provider prices (p0, p1) =
(c0, τ(c0)) . In the first SPNE firm 2 outsources η to 0 and the Cournot outcome is
played in G(p0, p1); in the the second SPNE firm 2 outsources η to 1 and the Stackelberg
outcome is played.
Proof See Section 5.
Essentially the same qualitative result can be stated for Model 2 (the game Γ˜(c1, c0, a)),
with some obvious modifications spelled out below. First, a little terminology. We say that
two SPNE are “equivalent in real terms” if they only differ in the provider prices quoted
by the firm to which nothing is outsourced. In other words, the two SPNE must have the
same quantities q ≡ {qij}i=0,1j=1,2, and also the same prices except perhaps the provider price pi
(i = 0, 1) at which there is no outsourced order (i.e., qi1 + q
i
2 = 0).
Theorem 2 (Competitive outside fringe) There is a threshold θ̂(c1) ∈ (c1, (a + c1)/2)
(same as in Theorem 1 with the strategic outside firm) such that, in the game Γ˜(c0, c1, a) the
following hold.
(I) Same as Theorem 1.
(II) Same as Theorem 1 except that p1 ∈ [τ(c0),∞) and the continuum of SPNE are
equivalent in real terms.
(III) Same as Theorem 1 except that the continuum of SPNE collapses to a unique SPNE
with p1 = τ(c0).
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(IV) Finally, if c0 = θ̂(c1), there is a continuum of SPNE. In one of these, p1 = τ(c0) and
firm 2 outsources η to firm 1. The rest are indexed by p1 ∈ [τ(c0),∞), are equivalent
in real terms and have firm 2 outsourcing to firm 0.
Proof See Section 5.
5 Proof of the main results
First we give an intuitive outline of the proof in Section 5.1. The formal proof, modulo some
technical lemmas, follows in Section 5.2. The proofs of the lemmas are in the Appendix.
5.1 Outline of the proof
We apply backward induction to determine SPNE of Γ and Γ˜.We therefore begin from Stage
3 of these games. Here p0, p1, q
1
2 are given and firms 1, 2 play the simultaneous-move game
G(p0, p1, q
1
2). It can be viewed as a Cournot game in which firm 2 has built a “capacity” of
q12 prior to the game. We show that that if the capacity q
1
2 is too small, the game yields the
standard Cournot outcome and if it is too large, part of the capacity remains unutilized (thus
for any p1 > 0, building a very large capacity cannot be optimal for firm 2). Intermediate
capacities have a commitment value and effectively establishes firm 2 as the Stackelberg
leader in the final good market α (Lemma S3).
Next we move back to Stage 2. Here p0, p1 are given and firm 2 has to choose its capacity
q12. We show that firm 2’s optimal choice is either
(i) to order nothing from firm 1 (i.e. q12 = 0) and instead order exclusively from firm 0 to
obtain the Cournot profit with cost p0
or
(ii) to order nothing from firm 0 and order exclusively the Stackelberg leader output from
firm 1 (i.e. build a capacity q12 exactly equal this output).
Whether firm 2 prefers to be a Stackelberg leader or a Cournot duopolist depends on the
relative values of p0 and p1. For any p0, we identify a function τ(p0) that represents the
leadership premium: if p1 < τ(p0), firm 2 prefers to be the Stackelberg leader and if p1 > τ(p0)
it prefers to be a Cournot duopolist (Lemma S2).
Finally we arrive at Stage 1 where firms 0 and 1 simultaneously set prices p0, p1 for the
intermediate good η (for Γ˜, where firm 0 is part of a competitive fringe, it has no strategic
role and p0 automatically equals c0). Any p0, p1 leads to the game G(p0, p1) whose SPNE
results in either the Cournot outcome or the Stackelberg outcome. In the Cournot outcome,
2 orders the good η exclusively from firm 0 and then the Cournot game ensues between firms
1 and 2 in the final good market α. In the Stackelberg outcome, 2 orders η exclusively from
firm 1 and then the Stackelberg game ensues between firms 1 and 2 in the market α with 2
as the leader and 1 the follower. Firm 1’s profit in the the market α is clearly lower when
it is the Stackelberg follower rather than a Cournot duopolist. Therefore 1 prefers to be the
follower only if it can obtain a sufficiently high supplier price of η from firm 2 so that it can
recover its losses in the market α. However, if firm 0 is not too inefficient compared to 1,
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it can undercut a high price of η set by 1. We identify a threshold θ̂ such that when 0’s
unit cost c0 is below θ̂, any SPNE will entail firm 2 ordering η from firm 0, followed by the
Cournot outcome in the market α. If c0 > θ̂, firm 2 orders η exclusively from firm 1, followed
by the Stackelberg outcome in the market α with 2 as the leader and 1 the follower (Lemma
S1, which immediately leads to Theorems 1 and 2).
5.2 The formal proof
Fix the inverse demand as in (1) and firm 1’s constant marginal cost at c1. Recall that C(c2)
is the Cournot duopoly with firms 1 and 2 where 2 has constant marginal cost c2. For i = 1, 2,
denote by κi(c2) the NE profit of firm i at C(c2).
Lemma 2 In any SPNE of Γ or Γ˜, (i) firm 0 obtains at least zero and (ii) firm 1 obtains at
least κ1(c0).
Proof (i) Follows by noting that firm 0 can always ensure zero payoff by setting a sufficiently
high input price (e.g., p0 > a) so that no firm places an order of η with it.
(ii) Observe that firm 1 always has the option of setting a sufficiently high input price
(e.g., p1 > a) to ensure that 2 does not order η from 1. For any such p1, 2 orders η only
from 0 and the game C(p0) is played in the market α. If x2 = 0 (i.e. 2 supplies nothing in
the market α) in the NE of C(p0), then firm 1 obtains the monopoly profit which is higher
than κ1(c0). If x2 > 0, we must have p0 ≥ c0 (otherwise firm 0 will obtain a negative payoff,
contradicting (i)) and 1 obtains κ1(p0) ≥ κ1(c0).
5.2.1 Stage 3 of Γ and Γ˜
Let p0 ≥ c1 and p1 ≥ 0. In Stage 3 of Γ, the simultaneous-move game G(p0, p1, q12) is played
between firms 1 and 2 (p0 ≡ c0 for Γ˜) where the strategy sets are given by (3) and (4) and
the payoffs are given in (6)-(7). From Lemma 1(ii), q01 = 0 (i.e. firm 1 produces η entirely
by itself), so by (6), its cost of η is c1q
1
1. Optimality requires that
(i) For firm 1, q11 = x1+q
1
2 (every unit of η produced by firm 1 is utilized completely either
to supply α or to fulfill the order of η for firm 2).
(ii) For firm 2, q02 = max{x2 − q12, 0}. If x2 ≤ q12 then q02 = 0 (if 2’s supply of α does not
exceed the amount q12 of η that it has ordered from 1, then it does not order η from 0)
and if x2 > q
1
2 then q
0
2 = x2 − q12 (if 2’s supply of α exceeds q12, its order of η from firm
0 equals exactly the additional amount it needs to meet its supply).
By (i) and (ii) above, G(p0, p1, q
1
2) reduces to the game where firms 1 and 2 simultaneously
choose x1, x2 ≥ 0. By (i) and (6), the payoff function of firm 1 is
Π1(x1, x2) = P (x1 + x2)x1 − c1x1 + (p1 − c1)q12. (9)
By (ii) and (7), the payoff function of firm 2 is
Π2(x1, x2) =
{
P (x1 + x2)x2 − p1q12 if x2 ∈ [0, q12],
P (x1 + x2)x2 − p0x2 − (p1 − p0)q12 if x2 > q12. (10)
By (9) and (10), G(p0, p1, q
1
2) is a Cournot duopoly between firms 1 and 2 where
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(i) firm 1 has constant unit cost c1,
(ii) firm 2’s constant unit cost is 0 for x2 ∈ [0, q12) and p0 for x2 > q12.
In a Cournot duopoly under inverse demand (1), if firm i has constant marginal cost ci,
its unique best response to its rival firm j’s quantity xj is b
ci(xj) = [(a − ci − xj)/2]+. Let
(xC1 (c2), x
C
2 (c2)) be the quantities of firms 1 and 2 in the unique NE of C(c2). We know that
(xC1 (p0), x
C
2 (p0)) =
{
((a− 2c1 + p0)/3, (a+ c1 − 2p0)/3) if p0 < (a+ c1)/2
((a− c1)/2, 0) if p0 ≥ (a+ c1)/2 (11)
(xC1 (0), x
C
2 (0)) =
{
((a− 2c1)/3, (a+ c1)/3) if c1 < a/2
(0, a/2) if c1 ≥ a/2 (12)
The following lemma follows from the fact that, under a Cournot duopoly, the best response
of a firm is decreasing in its rival’s quantity.
Lemma S3 (Stage 3) (i) G(p0, p1, q
1
2) has a unique NE where q
0
1 = 0, q
1
1 = x1 + q
1
2 and
which is given as follows:
(a) If q12 ∈ [0, xC2 (p0)), then x1 = xC1 (p0), x2 = xC2 (p0) and q02 = xC2 (p0)− q12;
(b) If q12 ∈ [xC2 (p0), xC2 (0)], then x1 = bc1(q12), x2 = q12 and q02 = 0;
(c) If q12 ∈ (xC2 (0),∞), then x1 = xC1 (0), x2 = xC2 (0) and q02 = 0.
(ii) Suppose p0 ≥ (a+ c1)/2. Then the NE of G(p0, p1, q12) is invariant of p0. Hence w.l.o.g.
we may restrict p0 ≤ (a+ c1)/2.
Proof See the Appendix.
5.2.2 Stage 2 of Γ and Γ˜: The leadership premium
Any node in Stage 2 of Γ corresponds to a specific price pair (p0, p1) ≡ p (for Γ˜, p0 ≡ c0)
where firm 2 chooses q12 ≥ 0 determining the ensuing game G(p0, p1, q12). This game can be
viewed as a Cournot duopoly between firms 1, 2 in which 2 has built a capacity q12 prior to
the game. Lemma S3 above has shown that building a capacity that is too high [q12 > x
C
2 (0)]
leads to some part of it being unutilized while a capacity that is too low [q12 < x
C
2 (p0)]
provides no strategic advantage to firm 2. By Lemma S3(i)(b), intermediate capacities
(q12 ∈ [xC2 (p0), xC2 (0)]) are fully utilized, and moreover firm 2 does not make any additional
order of η from firm 0 (i.e. its order is exclusively from firm 1). Thus in this range q12
constitutes a credible commitment that establishes firm 2 as the Stackelberg leader in the
(unique) NE of G(p0, p1, q
1
2). By (10) and Lemma S3, the payoff of firm 2 at the unique NE
of G(p0, p1, q
1
2) is
Πp2(q
1
2) =

κ2(p0) + (p0 − p1)q12 if q12 ∈ [0, xC2 (p0)),
P (bc1(q
1
2) + q
1
2) q
1
2 − p1q12 if q12 ∈ [xC2 (p0), xC2 (0)],
κ2(0)− p1q12 if q12 > xC2 (0).
(13)
For q12 ≤ xC2 (p0), firm 2’s choice is driven purely by cost considerations (whether p0 > p1 or
not). On the other hand, for any p1 > 0, choosing q
1
2 ≥ xC2 (0) is not optimal for firm 2.
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Recall that S21(p1) is the Stackelberg duopoly with firm 2 as the leader with cost p1 and
firm 1 the follower with cost c1. For q
1
2 ∈ [xC2 (p0), xC2 (0)], 2 solves the constrained problem
of the Stackelberg leader in S21(p1) that is restricted to choose its output in this interval.
Denote by (xS1(p1), x
S
2(p1)) the unique SPNE of S21(p1) and let `(p1) and f(p1) be the SPNE
profits of the leader (firm 2) and the follower (firm 1). It will be useful to define
x˜S2(p1) := min{xS2(p1), xC2 (0)} and x˜S1(p1) := bc1
(
x˜S2(p1)
)
= max{xS1(p1), xC1 (0)}.
It is clear that if p1 ≤ p0 (i.e. the unit cost of building the capacity q12 is less than the unit
cost of the standard Cournot game), then 2 would prefer to be the Stackelberg leader. Since
p0 ≥ c1 in any SPNE (Lemma 1), if firm 1 sets p1 ≤ c1 ≤ p0, then it does not obtain positive
profit as a supplier of η and moreover incurs the disadvantage of becoming a Stackelberg
follower. The next lemma shows that this cannot be sustained in an SPNE.
Lemma 3 In any SPNE of Γ or Γ˜ (i) if 0 < p1 ≤ p0, then firm 2 chooses q12 = x˜S2(p1) in
Stage 2 and consequently (ii) we must have p1 > c1.
Proof See the Appendix.
In the light of Lemma 3, consider p1 > c1 > 0. Then by (13), firm 2 will choose q
1
2 ≤ xC2 (0).
The SPNE of S21(p1) for p1 > c1 is given as(
xS1(p1), x
S
2(p1)
)
=
{
((a− 3c1 + 2p1)/4, (a+ c1)/2− p1) if c1 < p1 ≤ (a+ c1)/2
((a− c1)/2, 0) if p1 ≥ (a+ c1)/2. (14)
By (14), firm 2’s optimal choice of q12 is invariant in p1 for p1 ≥ (a + c1)/2. Henceforth,
without loss of generality, we shall consider p1 ≤ (a+ c1)/2. Note that(
x˜S1(p1), x˜
S
2(p1)
)
=
{ (
xC1 (0), x
C
2 (0)
)
if c1 < a/2 and p1 ≤ (a+ c1)/6(
xS1(p1), x
S
2(p1)
)
otherwise
(15)
If firm 2 chooses q12 = x˜
S
2(p1) (then q
0
2 = 0 and firm 0 obtains zero payoff), the market α has
the NE
(
x˜S1(p1), x˜
S
2(p1)
)
where firm 2 obtains the Stackelberg leader (possibly constrained)
profit ˜`(p1) := { κ2(0)− p1xC2 (0) if c1 < a/2 and p1 ≤ (a+ c1)/6`(p1) otherwise (16)
Firm 1’s payoff has two components: (i) the Stackelberg follower’s profit and (ii) its supplier
revenue (p1 − c1)x˜S2(p1). Hence its payoff is
F (p1) :=
{
κ1(0) + (p1 − c1)xC2 (0) if c1 < a/2 and p1 ≤ (a+ c1)/6
f(p1) + (p1 − c1)xS2(p1) otherwise (17)
We know by Lemma 3 that if p1 ≤ p0, it is optimal for firm 2 to choose q12 = x˜S2(p1). Now
consider p1 > p0. Then by (13), over q
1
2 ≤ xC2 (p0), it is optimal for firm 2 to choose q12 = 0
that yields the Cournot outcome with profits κ1(p0) and κ2(p0). Firm 0 supplies q
0
2 = x
C
2 (p0)
to firm 2 at price p0, so it obtains
Ψ(p0) = (p0 − c0)xC2 (p0). (18)
If 2 chooses q12 ∈ [xC2 (p0), xC2 (p0)] by paying p1 > p0 for the capacity q12, it can acquire the
leadership (possibly constrained) position in the market α. Firm 2 would prefer to be the
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leader as long as p1 is not too high compared to p0. Lemma S2 below shows that there is a
function τ(p0) ∈ [p0, (a+ c1)/2] (representing the leadership premium) such that 2 prefers to
be the Stackelberg leader as long as p1 < τ(p0). The detailed description of this function is
given in Appendix A1.
Let p0, p1 ∈ [c1, (a + c1)/2] and G(p0, p1) be the game that follows the announcement
p ≡ (p0, p1). If (x, q) ≡ 〈(x1, q01, q11), (x2, q02, q12)〉 is an SPNE of G(p0, p1), then (i) q12 is an
optimal choice of firm 2 that maximizes Πp2(q
1
2) given in (13) and (ii) (x1, x2) is the (unique)
NE of G(p0, p1, q
1
2) (Lemma 3). For i = 0, 1, 2 let Π
p
i (x, q) be the payoff of firm i at (x, q).
Lemma S2 (Stage 2) (Leadership premium) There is a continuous and strictly increas-
ing function τ : [c1, (a+ c1)/2]→ R+ such that for p0, p1 ∈ [c1, (a+ c1)/2]
(i) If (x, q) is an SPNE of G(p0, p1), then q
0
2q
1
2 = 0 (firm 2 orders η either exclusively from
firm 0 or exclusively from firm 1).
(ii) If p1 < τ(p0), the Stackelberg outcome is played in the unique SPNE of G(p0, p1) where
x2 = q
1
2 = x˜
S
2(p1), x1 = q
1
1 − q12 = x˜S1(p1) and q01 = q02 = 0. The payoffs are Πp0(x, q) = 0,
Πp1(x, q) = F (p1) and Π
p
2(x, q) =
˜`(p1).
(iii) If p1 > τ(p0), the Cournot outcome is played in the unique SPNE of G(p0, p1) where
x2 = q
0
2 = x
C
2 (p0), x1 = q
1
1 = x
C
1 (p0) and q
0
1 = q
1
2 = 0. The payoffs are Π
p
0(x, q) = Ψ(p0),
Πp1(x, q) = κ1(p0) and Π
p
2(x, q) = κ2(p0).
(iv) If p1 = τ(p0), G(p0, p1) has two SPNE: the Stackelberg outcome is played in one and
the Cournot outcome is played in the other.
Proof See the Appendix.
5.2.3 Stage 1 of Γ and Γ˜
Now we go to the first stage of Γ and Γ˜ where firms 0 and 1 simultaneously announce prices
p0, p1 (p0 ≡ c0 for Γ˜) that result in the game G(p0, p1). If p1 > τ(p0) in any SPNE of Γ
or Γ˜, then the Cournot outcome is played in the induced SPNE of G(p0, p1), firm 0 obtains
Ψ(p0) and firm 1 obtains κ1(p0). If p1 < τ(p0), the Stackelberg outcome is played, 0 obtains
zero and 1 obtains F (p1). Lemma 4 summarizes some properties of the functions Ψ(p0) and
F (p1).
Lemma 4 There is θ0(c0, c1) ∈ (c0, (a+ c1)/2) and θ̂(c1) ∈ (c1, θ0(c1, c0)) such that
(i) Ψ(p0) is strictly increasing for p0 ∈ [c1, θ0), strictly decreasing for p0 ∈ (θ0, (a + c1)/2]
and its unique maximum is attained at p0 = θ0.
(ii) Ψ(c0) = Ψ((a + c1)/2) = 0, Ψ(p0) < 0 for p0 ∈ [c1, c0) and Ψ(p0) > 0 for p0 ∈
(c0, (a+ c1)/2).
(iii) F (θ0) > κ1(θ0).
(iv) F (p1) is strictly increasing for p1 ∈ [0, (a+ c1)/2].
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(v) For p0 ∈ [c1, θ0], F (τ(p0)) T κ1(p0)⇔ p0 T θ̂.
Proof See the Appendix.
Part (v) of Lemma 4 asserts that firm 1 prefers the Stackelberg outcome over the Cournot
outcome for relatively large values of p0. To see the intuition for this, observe that both κ1(p0)
and F (τ(p0)) are strictly increasing in p0. While p0 has a direct effect on κ1(p0), its effect
on F (τ(p0)) takes place through the function τ(p0). The latter causes a stronger effect since
τ(p0) (the leadership premium) itself increases with p0. As firm 2 is willing pay a higher
premium for larger values of p0, it leads to higher supplier revenue for firm 1. This in turn
provides a better compensation to firm 1 for its follower position in the ensuing Stackelberg
game. This is the reason why the Stackelberg outcome is preferred by firm 1 for relatively
large values of p0.
Lemma S1 (Stage 1) (i) In any SPNE of Γ(c1, c0, a): (a) p1 > c1, (b) p1 = τ(p0) and (c)
p0 ∈ [c1, θ0].
(ii) In any SPNE of Γ˜(c1, c0, a): (a) p1 > c1 and (b) p1 ≥ τ(c0).
(iii) In any SPNE of Γ(c0, c1, a)
(a) the Cournot outcome is played if and only if p1 = τ(p0), p0 ∈ [c0, θ0] and p0 ≤ θ̂.
(b) the Stackelberg outcome is played if and only if p1 = τ(p0), p0 ∈ [c1, c0] and p0 ≥ θ̂.
(iv) In any SPNE of Γ˜(c0, c1, a):
(a) the Cournot outcome is played if and only if p1 ≥ τ(c0) and c0 ≤ θ̂.
(b) the Stackelberg outcome is played if and only if p1 = τ(c0) and c0 ≥ θ̂.
Proof See the Appendix.
5.2.4 Proofs of Theorems 1 and 2
Proof of Theorem 1 (I)(a) follows from Lemma 1. I(b) and (c) follow from Lemma S2.
(II) Observe from Lemma S1(iii) that if c0 < θ̂, there is no SPNE where the Stackelberg
outcome is played and a continuum of SPNE (indexed by (p0, p1) where p0 ∈ [c0, θ̂] and
p1 = τ(p0)) where the Cournot outcome is played. The outsourcing pattern under the
Cournot outcome follows from Lemma S2.
(III) Again from Lemma S1(iii), if c0 > θ̂, there is no SPNE where the Cournot outcome
is played and a continuum of SPNE (indexed by (p0, p1) where p0 ∈ [c1, c0] and p1 = τ(p0))
where the Stackelberg outcome is played. The outsourcing pattern follows from Lemma S2.
(IV) If c0 = θ̂, there are two SPNE, one where the Cournot outcome is played and one
where the Stackelberg outcome is played, each having p0 = c0 = θ̂ and p1 = τ(c0) (Lemma
S1(iii)). The outsourcing pattern again follows from Lemma S2.
Proof of Theorem 2 (I) follows from lemmas 1 and S2.
(II) Observe from Lemma S1(iv) that if c0 < θ̂, there is no SPNE where the Stackelberg
outcome is played and a continuum of SPNE, indexed by p1 ∈ [τ(c0),∞), where the Cournot
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outcome is played. The outsourcing pattern under the Cournot outcome follows from Lemma
S2. As firm 2 does not order any input from firm 1 in any of these SPNE, they are equivalent
in real terms.
(III) If c0 > θ̂, there is a unique SPNE, where p1 = τ(c0) and the Stackelberg outcome
is played (Lemma S1(iv)). The outsourcing pattern under the Stackelberg outcome follows
from Lemma S2.
(IV) If c0 = θ̂, then there is one SPNE where p1 = τ(c0) and the Stackelberg outcome is
played and a continuum of SPNE, indexed by p1 ∈ [τ(c0),∞) and equivalent in real terms,
where the Cournot outcome is played (Lemma S1(iv)). The outsourcing pattern again follows
from Lemma S2.
6 Discussion and extensions
6.1 Credible commitment versus public announcement
When firm 2 orders q12 units of the intermediate good η from firm 1, this constitutes a contract
between the two parties, whereby 2 is able to credibly commit itself to the purchase of q12
while 1 credibly commits to supply q12 to firm 2. Were one party to renege on its purchase
or sale, the other party would have recourse to the signed contract to take it to task.
The situation is quite different when firm 1 simply announces that it will produce q11
units for itself. If 1 were to renege, would 1 take itself to task? In the absence of an external
enforcement agency (like a courthouse), where 1 could go and write a binding contract to
produce q11 or else be liable for severe punishment, 1’s announcement is simply that: just
“cheap talk” and not a credible commitment.
We rule out the possibility of such binding contracts in our model. Thus if we envisage
the game where, anxious to be a Stackelberg leader, firm 1 first announces q11 and then firm
2 comes to it to order q12, 1 will always be free to change its mind later regarding q
1
1 upon
hearing q12. This fact is common knowledge to all the players. Hence every subgame that
follows an announcement by 1, is still Γ(c0, c1, a). Since we are looking at Subgame Perfect
Nash Equilibria, adding the initial announcements will have no effect and the same equilibria
will occur in the subgames as before.
Were an external agency in place to enable 1 to make credible commitments,11 our analysis
would no longer hold and it may well be possible for 1 to emerge as a Stackelberg leader,
with 2 outsourcing to 1. But our model rules out such a mechanism.
6.2 The secrecy clause
It is crucial to our analysis that the quantity outsourced by any firm j = 1, 2 to 0 cannot be
observed by the rival firm. This can be justified on the ground that outsourcing contracts
in practice do incorporate secrecy (non-disclosure) clauses (see, e.g., Temponi and Lambert,
2001; Ravenhill, 2003; Hoecht and Trott, 2006). In fact, in many cases it is legally binding
to have such clauses. Offshore outsourcing contracts are likely to come under the general
11Since we have linear costs and unbounded capacity, there is no autonomous costly action (such as building
up excess capacity a` la Dixit, 1980) that 1 can undertake to signal its commitment. An external agency is
needed for this purpose.
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purview of international trade laws that ensure protection of confidential information. For
example, Article 39 of the agreement of TRIPS (Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Prop-
erty Rights) of The World Trade Organization states:12
“Natural and legal persons shall have the possibility of preventing information lawfully
within their control from being disclosed to, acquired by, or used by others without
their consent in a manner contrary to honest commercial practices...so long as such
information:
(a) is secret in the sense that it is not...generally known among or readily accessible to
persons within the circles that normally deal with the kind of information in question;
(b) has commercial value because it is secret; and
(c) has been subject to reasonable steps under the circumstances, by the person lawfully
in control of the information, to keep it secret.”
Turning more specifically to outsourcing contracts, there is evidence of widespread use of the
secrecy clause. For example, in his study of projects outsourced to Kuwait, Khalfan (2004:
61) states that:
“Data confidentiality should be viewed as a critical element by the different parties,
and therefore should be respected by the vendor throughout the contracting period
and after termination. Taking into consideration that a particular vendor may work
simultaneously with two competing organizations, extra caution must therefore be
exercised to ensure that data confidentiality is not compromised...”
Discussing data protection laws of the European Union in the context of outsourcing, Vagadia
(2007: 121) also points out:
“Each party should recognize that under the agreement it may receive or become ap-
praised of information belonging or relating to the other, including information concern-
ing business and marketing plans...Each party should agree...not to divulge confidential
information belonging to the other to any third party...”
The secrecy clause is indeed widely used in practice, which is why we took it be exogenously
given in our model. However, it can often be deduced to hold endogenously in equilibrium
(in appropriately “enlarged” games). Indeed suppose that the quantity q outsourced by 2
to 0 can be made “public” (and hence observable by 1) or else kept “secret” between 2 and
0. We argue that a public contract can never occur (be active) at an SPNE, as long as the
game provides sufficient “strategic freedom” to its various players. For suppose it did occur:
1 knew that 2 buys q units of η from 0 at price p0. Thus 1 is a Stackelberg follower in the
final market α, regardless of whom 2 chooses to outsource η to. It would be better for 1
to quote a lower price p0 − ε for η. This would be certain to lure 2 to outsource to 1. But
p0 ≥ c0, since 0 could not be making losses at the presumed SPNE; hence p0 − ε > c1 for
small enough ε (recall c0 > c1). By manoeuvering 2’s order to itself, firm 1 thus earns a
significant profit on the manufacture of η. It does lose a little on the market for α, because
2 has a lower cost p0 − ε of η (compared to the p0 earlier), but the loss is of the order of ε.
Thus 1 has made a profitable unilateral deviation, contradicting that we were at an SPNE.
12Source: http://www.wto.org/english/tratop e/trips e/t agm3 e.htm
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Note that our argument relies on the fact that 1 has the strategic freedom to “counter”
the public contract. If, furthermore, 0 also has the freedom to reject the public contract and
counter it with a secret contract, then—foreseeing the above deviation by firm 1—firm 0 will
only opt for secret contracts.
The most simple instance of such an enlarged game is obtained by inserting an initial
binary move by 0 at the start of our game Γ. This represents a declaration by 0 as to whether
its offer to 2 is by way of a public or a secret contract. The game Γ follows 0’s declaration.
It is easy to verify that any SPNE of the enlarged game must have 0 choosing “secret”,
followed by an SPNE of Γ. Of course, more complicated enlarged games can be thought of.
For example, after the simultaneous announcement of p0 and p1 in our game Γ, suppose firm
2 has the option to choose “Public q” or ”Secret q” in the event that it goes to 0, followed
by “Accept” or “Reject” by 0. Clearly 1 finds out q only if “Public q” and “Accept” are
chosen. On the other hand, if 0 chooses “Reject” we (still having to complete the definition
of the enlarged game) could suppose that 2’s order of η is automatically directed to 1. This
game is more complex to analyze, but our argument above still applies and shows that a
public contract will never be played out in any SPNE.
We thus see that the secrecy clause can often emerge endogenously from strategic con-
siderations, even though—for simplicity—we postulated it in our model. It is apparent that
the firm placing orders (firm 2 in our model) may demand secrecy in order to protect sen-
sitive information from leaking out to its rivals and destroying its competitive advantage.
Our analysis reveals that the firm taking the orders (i.e., firm 0) may also—for more subtle
strategic reasons—have a vested interest in maintaining the secrecy clause.
6.3 Alternative pricing schemes
The pricing scheme we have considered in our model is unit-based, i.e., an input provider
charges a constant price for each unit that it supplies. Although other schemes such as flat
fees and profit-sharing arrangements are sometimes used in outsourcing, unit-based pricing is
the most prevalent (see, e.g., Barthe´lemy, 2003; Robinson and Kalakota, 2004 and Vagadia,
2007).
Not surprisingly, many papers (for instance, most of those that we have cited) are based
on unit pricing. However, it is important to go beyond this benchmark and investigate
alternative pricing schemes and their influence on the pattern of outsourcing. This is an
issue that we hope to take up in future work.
6.4 Variations of the model
Our model can be varied in many ways, but the essential theme remains intact: if O’s costs
are not much higher than I’s, J will outsource to O. Here we briefly indicate a few possible
variations.
6.4.1 Economies of scale
When there are there are increasing, instead of constant, returns to scale in the manufacture
of the intermediate good η, a new strategic consideration arises, though it does not affect
the tenor of our results. The primary strategic incentive to outsource to the outside firm 0
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can shift from firm 1 to firm 2. For now 2 must worry that if it outsources η to 1, then 1
will develop a cost advantage on account of economies of scale. In other words, 1 will be
able to manufacture η for itself at an average cost that is significantly lower than what it
charges to 2. This might outweigh any leadership advantage that 2 obtains by going to 1.
So, foreseeing a competitor in 1 that is fierce in spite of being a follower, 2 would prefer to
outsource to 0 as long as 0’s price is not too much above 1’s. This, in turn, will happen if
0’s costs are not significantly higher than 1’s. But then, if 2 is outsourcing to 0, economies
of scale can drive 1 to outsource to 0 as well!
These two strategic considerations, the first impelling 1 to push 2 towards 0 and the
second impelling 2 to turn away from 1 on its own and to seek out 0, are intermingled in the
presence of economies of scale. It is hard to disentangle them and say precisely when one
fades out, leaving spotlight on the other. But by eliminating economies of scale altogether,
we were able to focus on just the first scenario, wherein the game turns essentially on the
informational content of the strategies.
Economies of scale can easily be incorporated in our model. Suppose the average cost
ci(q) of manufacturing q units of η falls (as q rises) for both i = 0, 1. For simplicity, suppose
ci(q) falls linearly and that c0(q) = λc1(q) for some positive scalar
13 λ. It can then be shown
that there exists a threshold λ∗ > 1 such that if λ < λ∗:
(i) firm 2 outsources to firm 0 in any SPNE,
(ii) both firms 1 and 2 outsource to firm 0 in any SPNE when economies of scale are not too
small.
This result is established in Chen and Dubey (2009).14
6.4.2 Discriminatory pricing
The outsourcing result for increasing returns hinges on the fact that 0 cannot quote discrim-
inatory provider prices to 1 and 2. Otherwise firm 0 can benefit by setting different prices
in sequence to 1 and 2 (see, e.g., Arya et al, 2008a). However, in our model with constant
returns to scale, discriminatory prices are of no avail. This is so because firm 1’s cost c1 is
by assumption less than 0’s cost c0. The only reason 1 would contemplate buying from 0,
at a price necessarily as high as c0, is to make public its order and become a Stackelberg
leader vis-a`-vis 2. But this is ruled out by the secrecy clause. So 1 will always produce the
intermediate good by itself at a lower cost c1 and ignore 0’s offer.
6.4.3 Multiple firms of each type
Suppose there are n1, n2 replicas of firms 1 and 2. The timing of moves is assumed to be
as before, with the understanding that all replicas of a firm move simultaneously wherever
that firm had moved in the original game. Restricting attention to type-symmetric SPNE,
Theorem 1 again remains intact with a lower threshold in terms of the value of θ̂(c1).
13Thus c1(q) = max{0, c− bq} and c0(q) = λmax{0, c− bq} for positive scalars b, c, λ.
14It is needed here that the economies of scale be not too pronounced, otherwise pure strategy SPNE
may fail to exist. More precisely, for the average cost function c1(q) =max{0, c − bq}, it is assumed that
0 < b < c/2a to guarantee (i) the existence of pure strategy SPNE and (ii) in equilibrium, the quantity
produced entails positive marginal cost.
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6.4.4 Only Outside Suppliers
The strategic incentives that we have analyzed can arise in other contexts. Suppose, for
instance, that 1 and 2 both need to outsource the supply of the intermediate good η to
outsiders O = {O1, O2, . . .}. If 2 goes first to O and 1 knows which Oi has received 2’s order,
then 1 will have incentive to outsource to some Oj that is distinct from Oi, even if Oj’s costs
are higher than Oi’s, so long as they are not much higher. For if 1 went to Oi, it might have
to infer the size of 2’s orders and thus be obliged to become a Stackelberg follower (e.g.,
because Oi has limited capacity and can attend to 1’s order only after fully servicing the
prior order of 2). Alternatively, even if 1 does not know who 2 has outsourced to, or indeed
if 2 has outsourced at all, it may be safer for 1 to spread its order among several firms in O
so that it minimizes the probability of becoming 2’s follower. We leave the precise modeling
and analysis of such situations for future research.
Appendix
Appendix A1
The function τ(p0)
It will be useful to begin by defining τ1, τ2 : [c1, (a+ c1)/2]→ R+ as
τ1(p0) := 4p0(a+ c1 − p0)/3(a+ c1) and τ2(p0) := (3− 2
√
2)(a+ c1)/6 + 2
√
2p0/3. (19)
Denote g(p0) := (2/3)p0 + (1/3)(a + c1)/2. Observe that for t = 1, 2, τt(p0) is strictly
increasing, τt(p0) ∈ (p0, g(p0)) for p0 ∈ [c1, (a+c1)/2) and τ2((a+c1)/2) = (a+c1)/2. Denote
θ(c1) := (
√
2− 1)(a+ c1)/2
√
2. (20)
Observe that θ(c1) ∈ (0, (a+ c1)/6) and (i) τ1(p0) < τ2(p0) < (a+ c1)/6 if p0 ∈ [0, θ(c1)), (ii)
τ1(θ(c1)) = τ2(θ(c1)) = (a+ c1)/6 and (a+ c1)/6 < τ1(p0) < τ2(p0) if p0 ∈ (θ(c1), (a+ c1)/2].
The function τ(p0) is the continuous and strictly increasing function given as
τ(p0) =
{
τ1(p0) if p0 < θ(c1)
τ2(p0) if p0 ≥ θ(c1) (21)
The functions θ0(c1, c0) and θ̂(c1)
Define
θ0(c1, c0) := c0/2 + (a+ c1)/4 ∈ (c0, (a+ c1)/2) and (22)
θ̂1(c1) :=
4c1 + a
5
−
√
a2 − 7ac1 + c21
5
and θ̂2(c1) :=
a
14
+
13c1
14
. (23)
Observe that θ̂2(c1) ∈ (c1, θ0(c1, c0)) for c1 < a and
θ̂2(c1) T θ(c1)⇔ c1 T ρa where ρ ≡ 23/[121 + 84
√
2] ∈ (0, 1/2). (24)
Also note that for c1 < ρa, θ̂1(c1) is real and c1 < θ̂1(c1) < θ(c1) < θ0(c1, c0). Define
θ̂(c1) :=
{
θ̂1(c1) if c1 < ρa
θ̂2(c1) if c1 ≥ ρa
(25)
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Observe that θ̂(c1) is continuous and
θ̂(c1) S θ(c1)⇔ c1 S ρa. (26)
Appendix A2
Proof of Lemma 1 (i) For Γ˜, we have p0 ≡ c0 > c1, so consider Γ and suppose p0 < c1.
Since c1 < c0, firm 0 makes (p1 − c0) < 0 dollars per unit of the total outsourced order
q01 + q
0
2 that it receives. If it could be shown that q
0
1 + q
0
2 > 0, there would be an immediate
contradiction, because firm 0 can in fact ensure zero payoff by deviating from p0 to some
sufficiently high p′0 (e.g., p
′
0 > a), at which price neither firm will outsource anything to it.
To complete the proof, we now show that q01 + q
0
2 > 0.
Let q02 = 0 (otherwise we are done). If x2 > 0, we must have q
1
2 > 0. Then, since p0 < c1,
1 will pass on this order to 0, i.e., q01 > 0.
If x2 = 0, then, as is easily verified, x1 > 0, i.e., q
0
1 + q
1
1 > 0. But the cost of producing
q01 + q
1
1 is p0q
0
1 + c1q
1
1. Since p0 < c1, optimality requires that q
1
1 = 0, so q
0
1 > 0.
(ii) It is clear by (6) that if p0 > c1, then firm 1 will choose q
0
1 = 0. If p0 = c1 < c0 and
q01 > 0, then firm 0 obtains a negative payoff. As it can ensure a zero payoff by quoting a
sufficiently high price, we must have q01 = 0.
To prove Lemma S3, we first prove Lemma A1.
Lemma A1 The following hold for G(p0, p1, q
1
2).
(i) The unique best response of firm 1 to x2 ≥ 0 is bc1(x2). The unique best response of
firm 2 to x1 ≥ 0 is (a) bp0(x1) if q12 < bp0(x1), (b) b0(x1) if q12 > b0(x1) and (c) q12 if
bp0(x1) ≤ q12 ≤ b0(x1).
(ii) If (x1, x2) is an NE, then (a) x1 = b
c1(x2), (b) x2 = b
p0(x1) if x2 > q
1
2, (c) x2 = b
0(x1) if
x2 < q
1
2 and (d) b
p0(x1) ≤ x2 ≤ b0(x1) if x2 = q12.
(iii) (a) If q12 ≤ xC2 (p0), there is no NE where x2 < q12 and (b) if q12 ≥ xC2 (0), there is no NE
where x2 > q
1
2.
Proof (i) The first part is direct by (9). To determine firm 2’s best response(s), denote
m(x1) := min{b0(x1), q12} and M(x1) := max{bp0(x1), q12}. (27)
By (10), for x1 ≥ 0, the unique optimal strategy of firm 2 over x2 ∈ [0, q12] is m(x1) while
over x2 ∈ [q12,∞), it is M(x1). As bp0(x1) ≤ b0(x1) and x2 = q12 is feasible for both [0, q12] and
[q12,∞), (a)-(c) follow by (27).
(ii) Follows by (i).
(iii) (a) If (x1, x2) is an NE where x2 < q
1
2, then by (ii)(a) and (c), x1 = b
c1(x2) and x2 =
b0(x1). The unique solution to this system has x1 = x
C
1 (0) and x2 = x
C
2 (0) > x
C
2 (p0) ≥ q12,
contradicting x2 < q
1
2.
(iii) (b) If (x1, x2) is an NE where x2 > q
1
2, then by (ii)(a) and (b), x1 = b
c1(x2) and x2 =
bp0(x1). The unique solution to this system is x1 = x
C
1 (p0) and x2 = x
C
2 (p0) < x
C
2 (0) ≤ q12,
contradicting x2 > q
1
2.
Proof of Lemma S3 (i)(a) Let 0 ≤ q12 < xC2 (p0). First we show that (xC1 (p0), xC2 (p0)) is
an NE. Clearly xC1 (p0) is the unique best response of firm 1 to x
C
2 (p0). Since b
p0
(
xC1 (p0)
)
=
xC2 (p0) > q
1
2, x
C
2 (p0) is the unique best response of firm 2 to x
C
1 (p0).
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To prove the uniqueness, note by Lemma A1 (iii)(a) that if (x1, x2) is an NE, we must
have x2 ≥ q12.
If (x1, q
1
2) is an NE, then by Lemma A1(ii)(a) and (d), x1 = b
c1(q12) and q
1
2 ≥ bp0(x1) =
bp0 (bc1(q12)) . Since x2 S xC2 (p0)⇔ x2 S bp0 (bc1(x2)) , we have q12 ≥ xC2 (p0), a contradiction.
Hence if (x1, x2) is an NE, then x2 > q
1
2 and by A1 (ii)(a)-(b), x1 = b
c1(x2) and x2 =
bp0(x1). The unique solution of this system has x1 = x
C
1 (p0) and x2 = x
C
2 (p0), completing the
proof.
(i)(b) Let xC2 (p0) ≤ q12 ≤ xC2 (0). Since for c2 ∈ {0, p0}, x2 S xC2 (c2) ⇔ x2 S bc2 (bc1(x2)) ,
we have bp0 (bc1(q12)) ≤ q12 ≤ b0 (bc1(q12)) and by A1(i) it follows that (bc1(q12), q12) is an NE.
The uniqueness follows from A1(ii)(a)-(d) by noting that for this case there is no NE where
x2 6= q12.
(i) (c) Let q12 > x
C
2 (0). First we show that (x
C
1 (0), x
C
2 (0)) is an NE. Clearly x
C
1 (0) is the
unique best response of firm 1 to xC2 (0). Since b
0
(
xC1 (0)
)
= xC2 (0) < q
1
2, by (i)(b), x
C
2 (0) is
the unique best response of firm 2 to xC1 (0).
To prove the uniqueness, note by A1(iii)(b) that if (x1, x2) is an NE, we must have
x2 ≤ q12.
If (x1, q
1
2) is an NE, then by A1(ii)(a) and (d), x1 = b
c1(q12) and q
1
2 ≤ b0(x1) = b0 (bc1(q12)) .
Since x2 S xC2 (0)⇔ x2 S b0 (bc1(x2)) , we have q12 ≤ xC2 (0), a contradiction.
Hence if (x1, x2) is an NE, then x2 < q
1
2 and by A1(ii)(a) and (c), x1 = b
c1(x2) and
x2 = b
0(x1). The unique solution of this system has x1 = x
C
1 (0) and x1 = x
C
2 (0), completing
the proof.
(ii) If p0 ≥ (a + c1)/2 > c1, then q01 = 0 and in the NE of G(p0, p1, q12), q02 > 0 only if
q12 ∈ [0, xC2 (p0)) [part(i)]. Since xC2 (p0) = 0 for p0 ≥ (a+ c1)/2 [by (11)], we have q01 + q02 = 0
for p0 ≥ (a+ c1)/2, yielding zero payoff for firm 0. This proves (ii).
Proof of Lemma 3 (i) Observe by (13) that firm 2 chooses q12 ≤ xC2 (0) for any p1 > 0.
By lemmas 1 and S3, p0 ∈ [c1, (a + c1)/2]. If p0 = (a + c1)/2, then xC2 (p0) = 0 and the
result is immediate. So let p0 < (a + c1)/2. Then x
S
2(p1) > x
C
2 (p0) > 0 for p1 ≤ p0. As
the unconstrained maximum of Πp2(q
1
2) over q
1
2 ∈ [xC2 (p0), xC2 (0)] is attained at q12 = xS2(p1),
the constrained maximizer is q12 = x˜
S
2(p1) and Π
p
2(x˜
S
2(p1)) > Π
p
2(x
C
2 (p0)). Noting that for
q12 ≤ xC2 (p0)), Πp2(q12) is either increasing (if p1 < p0) or constant (if p1 = p0), it follows that
the unique global optimal choice for firm 2 in Stage 2 is q12 = x˜
S
2(p1).
(ii) If p1 ≤ c1, then firm 1 does not obtain any positive profit as a supplier of η. We will
show now that if p1 ≤ c1, firm 1’s profit in the final good market α is less than κ1(c0). Then
the result will follow from Lemma 2.
By Lemma 1, p0 ≥ c1. If 0 < p1 ≤ c1 ≤ p0, then by (i), it is optimal for firm 2 to choose
q12 = x˜
S
2(p1) = min{xS2(p1), xC2 (0)}. If p1 = 0, then by (13), it is optimal to choose either
q12 = x
S
2(p1) or any q
1
2 ≥ xC2 (0).
If q12 = x
S
2(p1), 2 will supply x2 = x
S
2(p1) in the market α (Lemma S3) and 1’s profit there
would be f(p1) < κ1(p1) < κ1(p0) ≤ κ1(c0). If q12 ≥ xC2 (0), then 2 will supply x2 = xC2 (0)
(Lemma S3) and firm 1’s profit from the market α would be κ1(0) < κ1(c0).
Proof of Lemma S2 First we prove (ii)-(iv). Part (i) follow immediately from (ii)-(iv).
To prove (ii)-(iv), note that in any SPNE of G(p0, p1), q
0
1 = 0 and x1 = q
1
1 + q
1
2. Denote
A1(p) = [0, x
C
2 (p0)] and A2(p) = [x
C
2 (p0), x
C
2 (0)]. Let A
∗
t (p) be the set of all maximizers of
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Π2(q
1
2) over q
1
2 ∈ At(p) and let A∗(p) be the set of all Π2(q12) over q12 ≥ 0. We know that
for p0, p1 ∈ [c1, (a + c1)/2], A∗ ⊆ A∗1 ∪ A∗2. We prove (ii) by showing that A∗(p) = {0} if
p1 < τ(p0), A
∗(p) = {x˜S2(p1)} if p1 > τ(p0) and A∗(p) = {0, x˜S2(p1)} if p1 = τ(p0).
By Lemma 3, A∗(p) = {x˜S2(p1)} if p1 ≤ p0. So consider p1 > p0. Then we know that
A∗1 = {0}. Let g(p0) := (2/3)p0 + (1/3)(a + c1)/2. If p0 = (a + c1)/2, then xC2 (p0) = 0 and
A = A2, so that A
∗ = A∗2 = {x˜S2(p1)}. Since g(p0) = τ(p0) = (a+c1)/2 for p0 = (a+c1)/2, the
proof for this case is complete. Now let p0 < (a+c1)/2, so that g(p0) > p0. For p1 ≥ g(p0), we
have x˜S2(p1) ≤ xC2 (p0). Hence A∗2 = {xC2 (p0)}. Thus, xC2 (p0) ∈ A∗2∩A1 but xC2 (p0) /∈ A∗1 = {0}.
Hence A∗ = A∗1 = {0}.
Finally let p1 ∈ (p0, g(p0)). Then A∗1 = {0} and A∗2 = {x˜S2(p1)}. Hence A∗ ⊆ {0, x˜S2(p1)}.
Note that Πp2(0) = κ2(p0) = (a+ c1− 2p0)2/9 and Πp2(x˜S2(p1)) = ˜`(p1). By (14), (15) and (16)
we have
˜`(p1) = { ̂`(p1) = (a+ c1)2/9− p1(a+ c1)/3 if c1 < a/2 and p1 ≤ (a+ c1)/6,
`(p1) = (a+ c1 − 2p1)2/8 otherwise. (28)
Comparing κ2(p0) = (a + c1 − 2p0)2/9 with ̂`(p1) and `(p1) we have the following where τ1,
τ2 are given in (19).̂`(p1) T κ2(p0)⇔ p1 S τ1(p0) and `(p1) T κ2(p0)⇔ p1 S τ2(p0) (29)
There are following possible cases, where θ(c1) is given by (20).
Case 1(a) If c1 < a/2 and p0 ≥ (a + c1)/6 > θ(c1), then by (21), τ(p0) = τ2(p0). Since
p1 > p0, under this case we have p1 > (a+ c1)/6.
1(b) If c1 ≥ a/2, then by (20), θ(c1) < c1 ≤ p0 and again τ(p0) = τ2(p0).
Observe by (28) that if either (a) or (b) holds, then ˜`(p1) = `(p1). Hence by (29),˜`(p1) T κ2(p0)⇔ p1 S τ2(p0) = τ(p0) proving the result for Case 1.
Case 2 c1 < a/2 and p0 < (a+ c1)/6:
2(a) If p0 ≤ θ(c1), then τ(p0) = τ1(p0) ≤ (a+ c1)/6 and τ2(p0) ≤ (a+ c1)/6 [by (21)].
(i) If p1 ∈ (p0, (a + c1)/6], then by (28), ˜`(p1) = ̂`(p1). Hence by (29), ˜`(p1) T κ2(p0) ⇔
p1 S τ1(p0) = τ(p0).
(ii) If p1 ∈ ((a+ c1)/6, g(p0)], then by (28), ˜`(p1) = `(p1). Hence by (29), ˜`(p1) < κ2(p0)
for p1 > (a+ c1)/6 ≥ τ2(p0).
The result for Case 2(a) follows by (i) and (ii) above.
2(b) If p0 ∈ (θ(c1), (a+ c1)/6), then τ(p0) = τ2(p0) > (a+ c1)/6 and τ1(p0) > (a+ c1)/6 [by
(21)].
(i) If p1 ∈ (p0, (a + c1)/6], then by (28), ˜`(p1) = ̂`(p1). Hence by (29), ˜`(p1) > κ2(p0) for
p1 ≤ (a+ c1)/6 < τ1(p0).
(ii) If p1 ∈ ((a+c1)/6, g(p0)), then by (28), ˜`(p1) = `(p1). Hence by (29), ˜`(p1) T κ2(p0)⇔
p1 S τ2(p0) = τ(p0).
The result for Case 2(b) follows by (i) and (ii) above.
Proof of Lemma 4 Parts (i)-(ii) follow from (18) by noting that xC2 (p0) = (a+ c1− 2p0)/3
for p0 ∈ [c1, (a+ c1)/2].
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(iii) Noting that θ0 > (a + c1)/6, by (17), we have F (p1) = f(p1) + (p1 − c1)xS1(p1). As
c1 < c0 < θ0 < (a+c1)/2, by (14), F (θ0) = (3a+2c0−5c1)2/64+(a+2c0−3c1)(a+c1−2c0)/16.
As κ1(θ0) = (5a + 2c0 − 7c1)2/144, we have F (θ0) − κ1(θ0) = (17a + 62c0 − 79c1)(a + c1 −
2c0)/576 > 0 since a > c0 > c1. This proves (iii).
(iv) Follows by standard computations by using (14) and (17).
(v) First let p0 ≥ θ(c1). Then by (21), τ(p0) = τ2(p0) ≥ (a + c1)/6. Hence by (14) and
(17), F (τ(p0)) = (a− 3c1+2τ(p0))2/16+ (τ(p0)− c1)[(a+ c1)/2− τ(p0)]. Comparing it with
κ1(p0) = (a− 2c1 + p0)2/9, we have the following where θ̂2(c1) is given by (23).
For p0 ≥ θ(c1), κ1(p0) T F (τ(p0))⇔ p0 S θ̂2(c1) (30)
Next observe that for p0 < θ(c1),
θ(c1) T c1 ⇔ c1 S ρa where ρ ≡ 1/(3 + 2
√
2) ∈ (0, 1/2) and ρ > ρ. (31)
Case 1 c1 ≥ ρa: Then by (31), [c1, (a + c1)/2) ⊆ [θ(c1), (a + c1)/2). As ρ < ρ, for this case
θ̂(c1) = θ̂2(c1) [by (25)] and the result follows by (30).
Case 2 c1 < ρa: Then by (31), [c1, (a+ c1)/2) = [c1, θ(c1)) ∪ [θ(c1), (a+ c1)/2).
If p0 ∈ [c1, θ(c1)], then by (21), τ(p0) = τ1(p0) < (a + c1)/6. Since c1 < ρa < a/2,
by (12) and (17), F (τ(p0)) = (a − 2c1)2/9 + (τ(p0) − c1)(a + c1)/3. Comparing it with
κ1(p0) = (a− 2c1 + p0)2/9, we have
κ1(p0) T F (τ(p0))⇔ w(p0) T 0 where w(p0) := 5p20 − 2(a+ 4c1)p0 + 3c1(a+ c1). (32)
Noting that (i) w(p0) is strictly decreasing for p0 ∈ [c1, θ(c1)], (ii) w(c1) > 0 and (iii)
w(θ(c1)) T 0⇔ c1 T ρa, we have the following two subcases.
Subcase 2(a) c1 ∈ [ρa, ρa): Then for all p0 ∈ [c1, θ(c1)), w(p0) > 0 and hence by (32),
κ1(p0) > F (τ(p0)). Since for this case θ̂(c1) = θ̂2(c1) ≥ θ(c1) [(23) and (26)], the result
follows by (30).
Subcase 2(b) c1 < ρa: Then θ̂2(c1) < θ¯(c1) [by (24)]. Hence by (30), κ1(p0) < F (τ(p0)) for
p0 ∈ [θ(c1), (a + c1)/2). For p0 ∈ [c1, θ(c1)), w(c1) > 0 > w(θ(c1)) and ∃ θ̂1(c1) ∈ (c1, θ(c1))
[given by (23)] such that κ1(p0) T F (τ(p0)) ⇔ p0 S θ̂1(c1). Noting that θ̂(c1) = θ̂1(c1) for
this case [by (25)], the proof is complete.
Proof of Lemma S1 (i)(a) Follows from Lemma 3.
(i)(b) If p1 < τ(p0), then firm 1 obtains F (p1). As F is monotonic (Lemma 4), 1 can
deviate to p′1 ∈ (p1, τ(p0)) to obtain F (p′1) > F (p1). So we must have p1 ≥ τ(p0).
If p1 > τ(p0), firm 0 obtains Ψ(p0). If p
′
0 is marginally higher or lower than p0, we will
have p1 > τ(p
′
0) and 0 would obtain Ψ(p
′
0) by deviating to p
′
0. As Ψ is strictly increasing for
p0 ∈ [c1, θ0) and strictly decreasing for p0 ∈ [c1, θ0) (Lemma 4), there are gainful deviations
for 0 if p0 6= θ0.
Now let p0 = θ0 and p1 > τ(θ0). Then firm 1 obtains κ1(θ0). By deviating to p
′
1 = θ0 <
τ(θ0), firm 1 would obtain F (θ0) > κ1(θ0) (Lemma 4). This completes the proof of (b).
(i)(c) If the claim is false, then p0 ∈ (θ0, (a + c1)/2]. Since p1 = τ(p0) [by (i)(b)], firm 0
obtains either 0 (the Cournot outcome) or Ψ(p0) (the Stackelberg outcome). Let 0 deviate
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to p′0 = θ0 < p0 so that τ(θ0) < τ(p0) = p1. Then 0 would obtain Ψ(θ0) which is positive and
more than Ψ(p0) (Lemma 4), proving the result.
(ii) Part (a) follows by (i)(a) and part (b) follows from the first paragraph of the proof
of (i)(b) by taking p0 ≡ c0.
(iii)(a) The “if” part: Let p1 = τ(p0), p0 ∈ [c0, θ0] and p0 ≤ θ̂. Then the Cournot outcome
is played in an SPNE of G(p0, p1), where 0 obtains Ψ(p0) ≥ 0 (since p0 ≥ c0) and 1 obtains
κ1(p0).We prove the result by showing that neither 0 nor 1 has a gainful unilateral deviation.
Clearly a deviation to p′0 < c0 is not gainful for firm 0. If it deviates to p
′
0 > p0, then
τ(p′0) > τ(p0) = p1 and it would obtain 0 ≤ Ψ(p0). If it deviates to p′0 ∈ [c0, p0), then
τ(p′0) < τ(p0) = p1 and it would obtain Ψ(p
′
0) < Ψ(p0) (by Lemma 4, since p0 ≤ θ̂ < θ0).
Now consider firm 1. If it deviates to p′1 > p1 = τ(p0), 1 would still obtain κ1(p0). If it
deviates to p′1 < p1 = τ(p0), 1 would obtain F (p
′
1) < F (τ(p0)) (by the monotonicity of F ).
Since F (τ(p0)) ≤ κ1(p0) for p0 ≤ θ̂ (Lemma 4), we have F (p′1) < κ1(p0). This completes the
proof of the “if” part.
The “only if” part: By (i), p1 = τ(p0) and p0 ∈ [c1, θ0] in any SPNE. Under the Cournot
outcome, firm 0 obtains Ψ(p0) and firm 1 obtains κ1(p0). If p0 < c0, then Ψ(p0) < 0. As 0
can deviate to p′0 = (a+ c1)/2 to obtain zero payoff, if the Cournot outcome is played in an
SPNE of Γ, we must have p0 ≥ c0.
By deviating to p′1 > p1 = τ(p0), firm 1 obtains F (p
′
1) which can be made arbitrarily
close to F (τ(p0)) by choosing p
′
1 close to p1. To ensure that firm 1’s deviation is not gainful
for any p′1 ∈ (0, p1), we need κ1(p0) ≥ F (τ(p0)), so by Lemma 4 we must have p0 ≤ θ̂.
(iii)(b) The “if” part: Let p1 = τ(p0), p0 ∈ [c1, c0] and p0 ≥ θ̂. Then the Stackelberg
outcome is played in an SPNE of the game G(p0, p1), where 0 obtains zero payoff and 1
obtains F (p1). We prove the result by showing that neither 0 nor 1 has a gainful unilateral
deviation.
If 0 deviates to p′0 > p0, then p1 = τ(p0) < τ(p
′
0) and it would still obtain zero payoff. If
it deviates to p′0 < p0 ≤ c0, then it would obtain at most zero and such a deviation is also
not gainful.
Now consider firm 1. If it deviates to p′1 > p1 = τ(p0), it would obtain κ1(p0) ≤ F (p1)
(by Lemma 4, since p0 ≥ θ̂). If firm 1 deviates to p′1 ∈ [0, c1), it would obtain less than
κ1(c1) (see the proof of Lemma 3(ii)) which is at most κ1(p0) ≤ F (p1). Finally if it deviates
to p′1 ∈ [c1, p1), it would obtain F (p′1) and by the monotonicity of F , such a deviation is also
not gainful.
The “only if” part: By (i), p1 = τ(p0) and p0 ∈ [c1, θ0] in any SPNE. Under the Stackel-
berg outcome, firm 0 obtains zero and firm 1 obtains F (p1) = F (τ(p0)). If p0 > c0, let firm
0 deviate to p′0 ∈ (c0, p0). Then p1 = τ(p0) > τ(p′0) and it would obtain Ψ(p′0) > 0, so we
must have p0 ≤ c0. If firm 1 deviates to p′1 > p1 = τ(p0), it would obtain κ1(p0). To ensure
that this deviation is not gainful, we need F (τ(p0)) ≥ κ1(p0), so by Lemma 4 we must have
p0 ≥ θ̂.
(iv) As firm 0 does not play any strategic role in Γ˜, we only check for unilateral deviations
of firm 1. Then the results follow from part (iii) by taking p0 ≡ c0.
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